No Need for Democracy: Inter-elite Conflict and Independence in the Andes
This papers uses a game-theoretic model to present the conditions that explain why political independence does not necessarily lead to more inclusive economic institutions. In particular, this paper shows how in a society composed by two elites (economic and political) and a non-elite, the conflict between elites leads to: 1) confrontation (war), and 2) limited voting rights and persistence of extractive economic institutions. Two elements prevent the accommodation between the elites: their similar strength, and the incapacity of the political elite to attract the non-elite. The ability of the economic elite to attract the non-elite to the independence militia articulated their actions and provided a credible mechanism to redistribute wealth and political power; with this mechanism in place, an extension of the franchise - democracy - was not needed. The paper contributes to the literature on the politics of development, democratization and the independence of Spanish America.