Popularity, Legislative Majority, or Party Building: What do Latin American Presidents' Prioritize?
Political leaders routinely make momentous decisions, but they cannot always get what they want. This is sometimes because these leaders have to act on the basis of incomplete information or because they realize that their options are risky. But it could also be because they have to abandon one goal to attain another. This paper proposes and estimates a structural equation model (SEM) to investigate how presidents make decisions on behalf of their governments in regards to budget allocation. What trade-offs do they face, and how do they resolve them? What are the constraints under which presidents operate, both within their governments and in the political system? Using data from Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela I demonstrate that Latin American presidents seek different goals when allocating resources. Whereas in Brazil the president seems to prioritize party building strategies, in Venezuela the main goal of the president is to build popularity. The presidents in Argentina and in Mexico are more likely to allocate resources based on legislative goals.